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Abstract 
 
This article draws upon insights from theoretical and empirical studies of coalition behaviour in 
multi-party politics to examine the formation of the UK coalition following the General Election 
of 6th May 2010. It argues that (1) the formation of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition is 
not unusual in historical terms or in the context of contemporary European politics; and (2) that 
although it is a break from the more recent pattern of post-war British politics it nevertheless does 
conform to our expectations in the light of the coalition literature. The article also provides a 
comparative analysis of the impact of Britain’s ‘First-Past-The-Post’ (FPTP) electoral system on 
party competition and an examination of the performance of the Alternative Vote (AV) system 
and argues that (1) if the UK retains FPTP then a return to single-party government in 2015 is 
highly likely; and (2) it is not inevitable that the introduction of AV would significantly advantage 
the Liberal Democrats. 
 
Key Words: Conservative Party, Liberal Democrats, Coalition Government, Electoral Systems, 
Alternative Vote. 
 
  
1

LEESPQ2010
Introduction 
This article poses a simple question and a speculative corollary to that question. And while the 
corollary is a little harder to answer, in a sense the main question is a rather more straightforward 
proposition. In the context of UK political history, coalitions are not usual. Disraeli may have 
argued in 1852 that ‘England does not like coalitions’, but that same year saw the formation of the 
1852-55 Aberdeen Ministry, made up of the Peelites and the Whigs. Moreover the first half of the 
20th century saw over 20 years of coalition government; starting with the Asquith and Lloyd 
George governments of 1915-1922, through various ‘National Governments’ under MacDonald, 
Baldwin, and Chamberlain between 1931 and 1939, followed by the short-lived Chamberlain ‘War 
Government’ of 1939-1940, and ending with highly successful Churchill Coalition of 1940-1945. 
Such coalitions formed in the context of crises for the nation (the Great War and its aftermath, the 
1930s Depression, the Second World War) or, more prosaically, crises for the political parties 
themselves. So in that sense coalition government is not alien to the British political tradition at all 
and it is interesting to note that David Cameron, with characteristic political intuition, harked back 
to these earlier coalitions by harnessing a narrative of national crisis and the need to govern ‘in the 
national interest’ during the coalition negotiations and early days of his government. 
 
Having said that, it remains true that in the context of post-war British politics coalition 
governments are indeed unusual. In this the UK has been different from continental Europe 
where, since 1945, some countries have been ruled exclusively by coalition governments, most 
have been ruled by a mixture of coalition and single-party government, and even an outlier like 
Spain, although nominally ruled exclusively by single-party governments, has been characterised by 
nationalist and regionalist parties acting as support parties to those governments. So does the 
formation of the current UK coalition indicate a ‘normalisation’, as it where, of British party 
politics? And if the coalition was to survive more than one political cycle – in other words, if it 
were to happen again – would this mean that we are now entering an era in which party politics 
becomes more ‘European’, based on a more consensual and cooperative style of government? 
 
To answer these questions, this article draws upon insights from theoretical and empirical studies 
of coalition behaviour in multi-party politics. The reader will be aware of the apocryphal French 
philosopher who chided his American colleague by saying ‘Well yes, it works in practice, but will it 
work in theory?’ and there are times when the academic literature on coalition behaviour seems 
guilty of prioritising theory over common sense. But the best work in this sometimes challenging 
area of political science does help us judge which particular coalitions are likely to form and gives 
us the ability to make predictions about the outcomes of coalition ‘games’; even in political systems 
about which we know very little. The next section of this article focuses on the process of coalition 
formation in May 2010, using a selection of analytical concepts derived from the coalition 
literature. It examines the structural drivers of coalition behaviour, both in terms of shares of seats 
and in terms of party programmes, and assesses the extent to which the real-world process of 
coalition negotiations following the General Election of 6th May 2010 conforms to our 
expectations in the light of the academic literature. This is followed by a second section, in which I 
use a comparative analysis of the impact of Britain’s ‘First-Past-The-Post’ (FPTP) electoral system 
on party competition to speculate about the chances of the UK coalition surviving beyond the next 
election. This also includes an examination of the performance of the Alternative Vote (AV) 
system, which Nick Clegg hopes might be the ‘game changer’ for the Liberal Democrats and which 
has been used by Australia in all elections to its lower house, the House of Representatives, since 
1918. Finally, the article concludes with a summary and synthesis of the arguments made. 
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So, is the UK coalition unusual? 
The literature on coalition behaviour is conceptually diverse and much early work relies upon 
insights derived from game theory, which portrays politicians as hard-nosed ‘office seekers’ with 
little regard for ideology. Some scholars argue that political parties are rational office-seeking actors 
and coalition ‘games’ take place under conditions that are both ‘constant sum’ (limited in size and 
scope) and ‘zero-sum’ (one player’s gain diminishes the potential benefits of all other players).1 The 
effectiveness of any political party playing the game depends upon the resources, in the form of 
parliamentary seats, which it brings to it. The bargaining power these seats generate are captured 
by ‘power indices’, such as the Banzhaf index2, which is expressed as a fraction of all swing votes 
(in which the outcome of a vote on a bill could be changed from ‘voted for’ to ‘voted-down’) each 
party is able to cast. A comparison of all parties’ voting power allows us to calculate the so-called 
‘effective number of parties’: the number of parties with the potential to determine the outcome of 
the coalition game.3 
 
Riker builds upon the game theoretical work of von Neumann and Morgenstern and predicts that 
players will try to create coalitions that are only as large as they believe will ensure winning: a so-
called ‘Minimal-’ or even ‘Minimum-Winning’ coalition. Leiserson, by contrast, argues that, in 
order to avoid unnecessary conflict and co-ordination problems, parties will want to be in the 
coalition with the smallest possible number of coalition partners: the so-called ‘bargaining 
proposition’. 
 
These early office-seeking models of coalition behaviour were criticised for being ‘policy blind’ and 
subsequent scholarship introduced a policy dimension to the coalition game. Two of the most 
cited examples of this turn towards ideology are the work of Robert Axelrod and Abram de 
Swaan. 4  Axelrod assumes that, whilst parties want to be a member of as small a coalition as 
possible, the members of the coalition that eventually forms will not only share a degree of 
common ideological ground but also that all coalition partners will be ‘connected’: that is, there will 
be no parties left outside the coalition with the potential to drive an ideological wedge between 
parties inside the coalition. These so-called ‘Minimal Connected Winning’ coalitions are assumed 
to be as large as necessary to secure a majority in parliament. De Swaan builds upon Axelrod’s 
assumptions and argues that players will prefer to be members of the Minimal Connected Winning 
coalition with the smallest ideological range. De Swaan also stresses the notion of the so-called 
‘median legislator’; the member who is located at the numerical centre of parliament and without 
whom no connected coalition can wield a majority. Because party discipline is assumed to be 
important, the political party to which the median legislator in parliament belongs must be 
included in any majority coalition. Similarly, the party that ‘owns’ the median legislator within the 
coalition will be crucial in shaping the new coalition’s programme for government. And if any 
party owns the median legislator in both parliament and coalition, it is considered to be decisive in 
determining the coalition’s potential composition, programme, and stability. 
 
Axelrod and de Swaan’s work portrayed ideology in Left-Right terms and more recent work on the 
ideological drivers of the coalition game has expanded the ‘policy space’ to include multiple 
ideological dimensions, such as libertarianism versus authoritarianism or centralisation versus 
decentralisation. The use of these so-called ‘dimension-by-dimension medians’5 has yielded many 
useful insights but it should be pointed out that plotting political parties’ relative positions in Left-
Right terms remains the best predictor of real-world coalition outcomes.6 I argue that there are 
three reasons for this. First, political leaders playing the coalition game do not have the time or 
inclination to make complex multi-dimensional calculations about their potential coalition partners. 
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Second, the parties these individuals lead impose considerable constraints on leaders’ room for 
manoeuvre and further limit the kind of calculations they can make. Finally, all players in the 
coalition game – and the parties they lead – are subject to what economists call ‘pure time 
preference’. 7  Put simply, this means that like the rest of us, politicians place greater value on 
benefits they can gain now or in the near future over those that might require more time to bring 
to fruition. The incentives to discount future benefits are, of course, made more compelling by the 
electoral cycle and the need for politicians to be able to demonstrate tangible successes to the 
electorate before the next election. As we shall see, there may be exceptions that prove the rule 
when for contingent reasons the Left-Right dimension is neutralised but, under normal 
circumstances, Left-Right issues such as taxation, spending, and redistribution allow politicians to 
get early ‘runs on the board’ in a fashion that can be conveyed to voters in quantifiable cash terms. 
Pure time preference also has two additional effects. First, it compels politicians to place more 
value on the instant gratification of the trappings of office over longer-term policy gains. Second, it 
pre-disposes them to prefer ‘tried-and-tested’ coalition arrangements as they have lower 
opportunity costs compared with those that are less familiar or even untried. 
 
TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE 
 
So what does this review of some of the key analytical tools from the coalition literature tell us 
about the current UK coalition government? Table one draws upon the concepts discussed above 
to analyse the coalition game following the General Election of 6th May 2010. The analysis excludes 
Sinn Féin, which does not recognise the authority of the UK Parliament and did not take up the 
five seats it won in the General Election. This leaves 10 players made up of nine parties 
(Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrats, DUP, SNP, Plaid Cymru, SDLP, Alliance, and Greens), 
plus the independent MP Sylvia Herman. In pure numerical terms there are 1024 (two to the 
power of ten) potential coalition outcomes, of which 506 are majority coalitions, including 15 
Minimal Winning Coalitions. Moving on to the Banzhaf index, each player has a score based on 
their seat share and these scores range from a high of 0.3626 for the Conservative Party to lows of 
0.0069 for Caroline Lucas of the Greens and Sylvia Herman. The Banzhaf scores demonstrate that 
bargaining power is concentrated between the Conservative Party, of course, and the Labour Party 
and Liberal Democrats, both of which have scores of 0.2286. This distribution is reflected in the 
score for the effective number of parties, which is 2.57. So, in practical terms, there were four 
feasible coalition outcomes: 
 
x First, a ‘Rainbow Coalition’ made up of Labour, Liberal Democrats, SNP, Plaid Cymru, 
SDLP, Alliance, Green and, possibly, Sylvia Herman. This would yield a majority of eight or nine 
respectively. 
x Second, a tighter minority coalition, dominated by the Labour Party and the Liberal 
Democrats, with formal or informal support from the Alliance, SDLP, and possibly Sylvia 
Herman. 
x Third, a minority Conservative government, possibly supported on ‘confidence and supply’ 
by the Liberal Democrats. This would fall 17 seats short of a working majority. 
x Fourth, a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition with a working majority of 41 seats. 
 
The precise modalities of these various outcomes and their practicality in the real-world politics of 
Westminster are discussed at greater length by Marc Debus and, in particular, by Tim Bale 
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elsewhere in this volume. What I argue here is that the eventual Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
coalition is the only potential coalition outcome consistent with the analytical tools described 
earlier. In other words, we can argue that the UK coalition is not unusual at all. There are five 
reasons for this: 
 
First, of the four outcomes, only the Rainbow Coalition and the Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
options yield a working majority. The two minority options, particularly the option of a minority 
Conservative government with Liberal Democrat support on confidence and supply, would not 
have been impossible in May 2010 but, as Tim Bale argues, there are a number of procedural 
reasons why such arrangements would have been unstable and no doubt short-lived. Second, 
although the Rainbow Coalition is the Minimal Winning Coalition with the smallest majority, it 
would have required the participation of seven parties and possibly one independent and therefore 
does not satisfy the bargaining proposition that stipulates that parties will try to join coalitions with 
the smallest possible number of coalition partners. By contrast, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
option is also a Minimal Winning Coalition and, as it only requires the involvement of two political 
parties, this option also satisfies Leiserson’s bargaining proposition. 
 
Third, if we introduce the notion of ideological connectedness then the Rainbow Coalition is the 
Minimal Connected Winner. But given the range of parties involved, we must assume that the 
ideological range of such a coalition would be large; with all of the problems in forging a common 
programme associated with this. Under these circumstances, it is not unreasonable to assume that 
the Conservative-Liberal Democrat option is the Minimal Connected Winner with the smallest 
ideological range. But, in practical terms, what does this mean? Using data derived from the 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat election manifestos, Marc Debus demonstrates that the two 
parties are connected along what he calls the ‘centralisation-decentralisation’ ideological dimension. 
This connectedness is certainly evident in the coalition’s enthusiasm for themes such as promoting 
the ‘big society’, rolling back the State, and devolving responsibility for many aspects of policy 
delivery down to local government and other stakeholders. And in the context of the analytical 
concepts used in this article, it could be argued that the constraints placed upon any incoming 
government by the state of the UK’s finances in May 2010 served to limit the kind of ‘tax and 
spend’ policies that would have underpinned the Liberal Democrats’ ideological connectedness 
(with Labour) along the Left-Right dimension. In other words, one might conclude that because of 
the contingencies of the economic crisis the Left-Right dimension was temporarily neutralised as 
the key ideological dimension along which political coalitions form. However, I take a different 
tack and argue that the Left-Right dimension remained central to politicians’ calculations in May 
2010. This is consistent with Tim Bale and Mark Oaten’s assertions that, following the elite 
takeover of the Liberal Democrats by Nick Clegg and other colleagues associated with the party’s 
‘Orange Book’ tendency; by May 2010 the Liberal Democrats had moved to the political right and 
the party was positioned between the Conservative and the Labour Party on the Left-Right axis. As 
the subsequent widespread sense of betrayal over the party’s high profile election pledge on 
university tuition fees demonstrates, the constraints imposed on the leadership by the Liberal 
Democrats’ internal democratic structures prevented this ideological shift from being reflected in 
the party’s 2010 election manifesto. Nevertheless, Bale’s contention that the ‘economic liberals’ 
had captured the party is highly plausible and would explain why, in the months following the 
formation of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, the enthusiasm of Nick Clegg, Danny 
Alexander and, briefly, David Laws for ‘rebalancing’ the economy, rolling back the public sector 
and aggressively tackling the UK’s budget deficit often seemed the equal of that displayed by their 
Conservative colleagues. 
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Fourth, the ideological positioning of the Liberal Democrats and their ability to engage with the 
Conservatives as well as Labour is reflected in the fact that, following the 2010 General Election, 
the party owned the median legislator in the Commons. This attribute, even more than the party’s 
strong Banzhaf score described earlier, made the Liberal Democrats decisive in the coalition game 
because the party’s cooperation was required in the formation of any majority connected coalition. 
This was a fact that David Cameron, with his audacious ‘big, open offer’ to the Liberal Democrats 
on the 7th of May, seemed to grasp far more quickly than Gordon Brown. But the respective size 
of the two parties meant that the Conservatives owned the median legislator within the subsequent 
coalition and, the model suggests, this attribute offsets the influence enjoyed by the Liberal 
Democrats. This balance between median legislators in parliament and coalition is quite common 
in other countries and is assumed to have an impact on the tone of coalition negotiations and the 
subsequent division of ministerial portfolios. As Akash Paun describes in this volume, the division 
of portfolios in the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition sees the Liberal Democrats punching 
above their weight in simple numerical terms but failing to secure the key ‘blue-chip’ portfolios 
(Chancellor of the Exchequer, Home Secretary, Foreign Secretary) that define the direction of 
travel of any government. This over-representation is consistent with established patterns found in 
countries with a longer tradition of coalition government, such as Germany.8 
 
Finally, I argue that the outcome of the coalition game also satisfies the assumption of ‘pure time 
preference’, in which politicians – for reasons of human nature as well as the demands of the 
electoral cycle – favour office-seeking over policy considerations and, subsequently, prefer policies 
with shorter time horizons over those with longer-term benefits. It also implies that politicians will 
gravitate towards ‘tried-and-tested’ coalition arrangements rather than those that are less familiar. 
This is certainly the case with the Conservative-Liberal Democrat option, which had already 
become commonplace in town halls across the country, from Reading to the Wirral. This is not the 
case with the Rainbow Coalition option. In terms of individual politicians’ motives, however, it is 
not possible to construct windows into the souls of Nick Clegg and his colleagues in order to 
determine if the decision to enter into coalition with the Conservatives was an exercise in naked 
office-seeking. We can, however, argue that the programme they agreed with their Conservative 
colleagues does reflect the need to get those early ‘runs on the board’. For, counter-intuitive as it 
might seem, the scale and timing of the Chancellor’s budget savings do indicate a desire to hit the 
ground running, as does the speed (some might say haste) of reform in other areas such as 
education and health. Moreover, even the Liberal Democrats’ decision to ditch their long-standing 
commitment to the Single Transferable Vote (STV) in favour of a referendum on the more limited 
AV is consistent with a determination to not make the best the enemy of the good. Whether the 
decision to opt for AV will actually be in the best interests of the Liberal Democrats is discussed in 
the next section of this article but it is part of a wider pattern. For when the Cameron 
government’s policy programme is taken in the round and examined in the context of the 
coalition’s desire to introduce five-year fixed term parliaments, what becomes obvious is that it is 
based around a limited number of clear policy objectives that are achievable within one electoral 
cycle and where it is assumed that the benefits anticipated from them will become apparent before 
the government has to once again face the voters. Clearly, both Cameron and Clegg are confident 
that they will be able to campaign on the coalition’s record five years hence but, if one was to make 
one (non-partisan) criticism of the current government, it is that the focus on the short-to 
medium-term is at the cost of a longer-term narrative about what Britain might look and feel like 
in, say, a decade from now. 
 
How likely is it to happen again? 
6

LEESPQ2010
Does this lack of a longer term narrative matter? Is the current UK coalition a one-off political 
arrangement willed into existence by two pragmatic party leaders as a reaction to the legislative 
arithmetic following the 2010 General Election? Or might it become a more permanent 
arrangement? In short, how likely is it to happen again? Political scientists are no better than 
economists at forecasting future developments and much will depend on contingent factors such 
as the performance of the Cameron government, how the two constituent parties fair in the 
opinion polls, whether the two parties agree some form of electoral pact at the next election, as 
well as the impact, malign or otherwise, unforeseen or anticipated, of what Harold Macmillan 
referred to as ‘events’. Nevertheless, on the basis of what we know about the past performance of 
Britain’s FPTP electoral system and also about the performance of the only alternative on offer, 
AV, we can make one or two tentative observations that help us assess the probability of the UK 
coalition surviving more than one electoral cycle. 
 
Starting with FPTP, the reason why there was a coalition game at all in May 2010 was because 
Britain’s electoral system failed in its major task: to convert the largest party’s plurality of votes in 
the country into a working majority at Westminster. Despite the failure of the Conservative Party 
on this occasion, however, FPTP remains a highly disproportionate electoral system that favours 
the larger political parties and/or those parties with more limited electoral support that is not 
diffused across the electorate but rather sufficiently concentrated in geographical terms to win 
parliamentary seats. This is in stark contrast to STV or List PR systems.  
 
FIGURE ONE ABOUT HERE 
 
To demonstrate this, Figure One shows the relationship between the disproportionality of electoral 
systems and the effective number of parties in the Commons, and also in the lower houses of the 
other European countries. Electoral proportionality is measured by the so-called ‘least squares 
index’, devised by the political scientist Michael Gallagher, which measures the disparity between 
the distribution of votes cast in elections and the subsequent allocation of seats.9 The higher the 
least squares score the more disproportionate the system is judged to be. The data is based on year-
on-year means over the twenty years from 1990 until the eve of the 2010 General Election and the 
trend line demonstrates that as a general rule the more disproportionate the electoral system, the 
lower the effective number of parties within parliament.10 
 
As is apparent from figure 1, over the course of the last two decades the UK electoral system has 
been one of the most disproportionate (second to France) and has generated the joint smallest 
average effective number of parties (along with Greece). What is also clear is that those countries 
that have always been governed by coalitions (marked by green squares in the figure) or have been 
governed by a mixture of coalitions and single-party government (marked by blue diamonds) tend 
to have far more proportional electoral systems and generate a larger effective number of parties. 
Crucially when assessing the significance of the May 2010 General Election, the data for it are not 
far out of line from the UK averages since 1990. In the 2010 election the least squares score was 
15.1 (down slightly from the average of 15.9) and, as already discussed, the effective number of 
parties was 2.57 (up slightly from 2.3). This does not suggest that May 2010 represented a sea-
change in the underlying dynamics of the UK party system and, on the basis of past performance, 
one must conclude that if the UK retains its FPTP electoral system then a return to single-party 
government in 2015 is highly likely. 
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FIGURE TWO ABOUT HERE 
 
But what happens if Nick Clegg manages to win the planned referendum on AV in 2011? Leaving 
aside doubts as to whether the referendum can be won, would the introduction of AV indeed be a 
game changer for the Liberal Democrats? Figure Two also plots the relationship between the 
disproportionality of electoral systems and the effective number of parties in the Commons and 
the other European lower houses but introduces two new perspectives: the pointers now denote 
the type of electoral system in each country and now include an additional country, Australia, which 
as was discussed in the introduction to this article, uses AV for elections to the House of 
Representatives.  
 
Like FPTP and indeed the ‘two-round system’ (TRS) used in France, AV is a ‘plurality-majority’ 
electoral system. Like FPTP it retains the so-called ‘constituency link’, in which single members of 
parliament represent single constituencies. However, there are three key ways in which AV differs 
from FPTP that, it is argued, might offer hope to the Liberal Democrats. 
 
First, unlike FPTP, under AV voters are given the chance to rank candidates according to 
preference rather than cast their vote for just one candidate. If a candidate wins a majority of the 
‘first preference’ votes then he or she is elected but, in the absence of such a clear majority, the 
preferences of the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated and their preferences re-distributed 
to the remaining candidates. This process is repeated until a clear winner emerges. Thus, AV is 
designed to produce majorities for winning candidates in parliamentary seats rather than just a 
plurality of votes. This means that it better reflects the preferences of voters in those seats and, as 
result, has been called a ‘fairer’ system than FPTP. However, this does not mean that the outcome 
of constituency votes under AV would necessarily differ greatly from that which might have been 
achieved under FPTP. As the Australian political scientist Colin Hughes points out, preferences 
had to be re-distributed in 30.8 of constituencies over the course of 33 elections to the Australian 
House of Representatives between 1919 and 2001 but this only resulted in a different outcome 
from that achieved under FPTP in 5.9 per cent of the constituencies11. Thus, on the evidence from 
Australia, the chances of a party ‘coming through the middle’ to take a seat appears limited. It 
remains to be seen if this would also be the case in the UK. 
  
Second, unlike FPTP and TRS, the majoritarian effects of AV do not necessarily extend to the 
aggregate level. In other words, AV is not explicitly designed to produce parliamentary majorities 
and as a rule Australian governments have not enjoyed the huge parliamentary majorities enjoyed 
by, say, Margaret Thatcher or Tony Blair. However, this does not necessarily mean that the Liberal 
Democrats would benefit. For example, as Figure Two demonstrates, whilst AV as it operates in 
Australia is notably less disproportionate than FPTP in the UK (an average score of 10.1 over the 
last twenty years, compared with 15.9), the difference is not enormous and AV remains 
considerably more disproportionate than the Liberal Democrats’ former preference of STV, or 
indeed other proportional systems such as List PR or Mixed Member Proportional systems. This is 
reflected in the effective number of parties for Australia, which at an average of 2.42 is only 
slighter larger than the 2.3 found in the UK. Indeed, although for historical reasons (notably the 
difficulty of reconciling urban and rural interests in a massive and diverse continent) the right wing 
of Australian politics is dominated by a semi-permanent ‘Coalition’ dominated by the 
(predominantly urban and suburban) Liberals and the (rural) National Party, it should be regarded 
as a de facto single actor, like the Christian Democratic CDU/CSU in Germany. The Coalition is 
currently in opposition to a single-party minority government of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) 
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and the political tone since at least 1945 has very much been one of an adversarial ‘two party 
dominant’ politics and responsible government rather than the consensual continental-style 
coalition politics desired by the Liberal Democrats. 
 
FIGURE THREE ABOUT HERE 
 
It is of course true that there is no guarantee that the pattern of politics found in Australia would 
be repeated in the UK and, whilst some studies have suggested that the Liberal Democrats would 
have benefited greatly in recent elections, it has also been argued that the Conservative Party could 
be the big winner in the future.12 So the jury is out on AV but what we do know is that if the 
patterns found in Australia were replicated in the UK then the results could be disappointing for 
the Liberal Democrats. Nor can the Liberal Democrats take comfort from the idea that this 
squeeze of third parties is down to the vagaries of Australian political culture. Figure Three 
compares the effective number of parties in the Australian House of Representatives (elected by 
AV) and Senate (elected by STV) over the period 1990 to 2010. The two chambers have different 
electoral cycles, with members of the House serving three-year terms, whilst Senators serve six year 
terms with half of the Senate elected every three years. However, Figure 3 demonstrates clearly that 
over the period STV produced a higher average effective number of parties in the Senate (3.01) 
than AV produced in the House of Representatives (2.42). Thus, Australia does have the kind of 
genuine multi-party system that the Liberal Democrats claim to favour. But it is not to be found in 
the House of Representatives under the AV system the party now favours but rather in the Senate, 
where in recent years senators from the ALP, the Coalition, and also Greens, Democrats and 
independents have been elected by STV. 
 
Conclusions 
This article has argued that the formation of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition is not 
unusual in historical terms, nor is it in the context of contemporary European politics. It also 
argues that although it is a break from the more recent pattern of post-war British politics it 
nevertheless does conform to our expectations in the light of the coalition literature. So, on 
balance, the UK coalition is not unusual. 
 
But does this break from the recent pattern represent a real change in Britain’s style of government 
or is it a one-off event, brought about by a rare distribution of parliamentary seats in this 
parliament, and after which normal service will be resumed? In other words, what are the chances 
of it happening again? Of course, if the Liberal Democrats do reap the electoral benefits of being 
seen as a realistic party of government and/or if there is a similar distribution of seats at the next 
General Election then, of course, it can happen again. But, as this article demonstrates, under 
Britain’s existing FPTP system or, I would argue, even under AV, the evidence suggests that it is 
reasonable to suspect that David Cameron rather than Nick Clegg will be the more optimistic 
about his prospects of remaining in government after 2015. 
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Table 1. Exploring the Coalition Game following 6 May 2010 General Election  
Party  Sinn Féin Green SNP Plaid Alliance SDLP Ind Labour LibDem Con DUP 
Seats  (5) 1 6 3 1 3 1 258 57 306 8 
Working Majority     323       
Potential numerical outcomes     1024       
Minimal Winners     15       
Banzhaf index 0.0000 0.0069 0.0554 0.0185 0.0069 0.0185 0.0069 0.2286 0.2286 0.3626 0.0670 
‘Effective number’ of parties     3.71       
Bargaining Proposition         LibDem Con  
Minimal Connected Winner  Green SNP Plaid Alliance SDLP Ind Labour LibDem   
Minimal Connected Winner with 
smallest ideological range 
        LibDem Con  
Median Legislator in Parliament         LibD me   
Median Legislator in Coalition           Con  
Tried-and-tested coalition?     Yes       
Tried-and-tested alternatives?     No       
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Figure One. Relative disproportionality of electoral systems and ‘effective number of parties’ for UK and 15 European Party Systems 
 
Key:      Single Party Government;    Single Party and Coalition Government;    Coalition Government                                                                                       
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Figure Two. Relative disproportionality of electoral systems and ‘effective number of parties’: UK and Australia compared 
 
Key:      First-Past-the-Post;     Two-round system;     Mixed system;    PR (List or STV);     Alternative Vote                                                                                 
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Figure Three. Effective number of parties for Australian House of Representatives (AV) and Australian Senate (STV), 1990-2010 
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